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Abstract 
This paper discusses evidence on the initial underpricing of Initial Pub-
lic Offerings in the Athens Stock Exchange, during the period 1990-2003. 
Differences in average initial returns are analyzed in terms of differential 
IPO characteristics. The findings suggest that in the Athens Stock Exchange 
there exists a relatively high degree of information asymmetry. The findings 
are similar to those, which have been observed in the majority of the emerg-
ing markets. 
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I. Introduction 
The empirical evidence accumulated in recent years is unanimous in its 
conclusion that large one-day IPO returns
1
 were observed on the offer date. 
This phenomenon has been intensively studied, in an attempt to provide a 
rationale for underpricing. The suggested explanations are based primarily on 
theories of asymmetric information (Ritter and Welch, 2002). Loughran, 
                                                        
1
 Price change measured from the offering price to the market price at the end of the 
first trading day. 
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Ritter and Rydqvist (2003) provide an international perspective on IPO un-
derpricing utilizing data from 38 countries. They reported that underpricing 
was present in all the stock markets under study. Moreover, it varies very 
strongly from market to market (from a 5,4% in Denmark, to a 256,90% in 
China
2
). In addition, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) have noted the existence of 
certain periods (“hot issue markets”) in which a greater underpricing was 
observed. In spite of a number of plausible explanations that have been of-
fered to account for this phenomenon, there is still considerable uncertainty 
about its determinants. The main purpose of this paper is to test the validity 
of certain (testable) hypotheses regarding the IPO stocks in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section II, previous litera-
ture on underpricing is discussed. In Section III, the utilized data and the em-
ployed methodology are described. The results of the study as well as their 
interpretation are reported in Section IV.  Conclusions appear in Section V. 
II. Literature Review 
Previous IPO literature has suggested a number of possible explanations 
for IPO underpricing. Most of the rational expectation models suggest that 
information asymmetry among various participants is responsible for IPO 
underpricing
3
. 
Rock (1986) views this situation as a “winner's curse” problem. He as-
serts that there exist two groups of investors, those possessing superior in-
formation (“informed investors”), thus being able to select underpriced new 
issues and the “uninformed” ones who usually buy the overvalued IPO’s. If 
this is the case, the uninformed investors would loose their interest for the 
IPO’s market, in the long term. To prevent such a reaction, underwriters and 
issuers try to secure satisfactory returns, for those investors, through the un-
derpricing of the new issues. In order to find empirical evidence in support of 
the “winner's curse” hypothesis, Beatty and Ritter (1986) introduced the test-
able variable of “ex-ante uncertainty”.  They suggest that there exists a posi-
tive correlation between the expected underpricing and the lack of informa-
tion, which may be tested through the examination of the relationship among 
                                                        
2
 For the list of average initial returns across the 38 countries, the time periods ob-
served and their respective sources see Table 1 in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist 
(2003). 
3
 There are also other alternative explanations, such as hot issue markets (Ritter, 
1984), industry effects (Ibbotson and Jaffe, 1975; Ritter, 1984), legal insurance 
(Tinic, 1988), monopoly power (Welch, 1992) and presale information gathering 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989). 
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certain proxies, such as the firm’s age, its size, the percentage of the equity 
capital maintained by the initial shareholders after the IPO (free float), the 
(ex-post) bid-ask spread and the price volatility.  
The presence of information asymmetry also leads to underpricing 
through a “signaling equilibrium” where firms demonstrate their quality by 
“leaving more money on the table”, that is by undervaluing the new issues. 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) 
have shown that this strategy may be optimal for firms that plan to do sea-
soned equity offerings (secondary offerings) following the IPO.  
Another group of researchers (Affleck-Graves, 1993) have formed the 
hypothesis that investors demand lower returns for IPO’s listed in the mar-
kets, which meet higher trading standards. Thus, high underpricing levels 
imply markets with low standards (“certification” hypothesis).  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) and Benveniste, Busaba and Wilhelm 
(1996) explain underpricing as a consequence of the pre-selling process (road 
show). Investors are less likely to truthfully reveal their demand for an IPO if 
this “indication of interest” is only likely to push up the offer price. Under-
pricing is the reward for truth telling and therefore, should be higher for of-
fers where there is strong demand. The relevant empirical tests use the over-
subscription rate as a proxy for information revelation and find that under-
pricing is greater for IPO’s that are strongly over -subscrided (Hanley, 1993).  
Finally, a debate is going on, about “optimal selling procedures” in 
IPO’s (fixed price offer versus book building). A number of researchers 
(Benveniste and Spindt, 1989; Camp, 2000; Arosio, Giudice and Paleari, 
2000) have suggested that the book building procedure is efficient since it 
induces ex-ante uncertainty (contrary to the fixed price offer). 
III. Data, sources and methodology 
The Bank Reforming Law of 1988 can be characterized as the fundamen-
tal stone on which the development of the Greek Financial System was 
based, mainly because it seriously lowered the restrictions under which the 
affected companies were operating before. After an adjustment period of 1-2 
years, they restructured their banking and stock exchange activity, incorpo-
rating the new – more favorable – legislation in force.  
Especially for the ASE, that period was very crucial, given the fact that 
we had the introduction of stockbroking firms, while the Securities and Ex-
change Commission was essentially enforced. As a result, the activity in the 
primary and secondary stock exchange markets were quite higher in subse-
quent years, enabling the mining of more extensive and effective data for the 
researchers. In general, the ASE data referred to time periods started from 
1990 can be considered as belonging to its “new age” and they are hardly 
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comparable to corresponding data of earlier periods. This is the reason for 
selecting the 1990-2003 as the sampling period of the present study. 
The sample, (258 companies) comprises of all new listings between 
January 1990 and December 2003, including subsequently delisted compa-
nies but excluding the merged ones, the companies of the financial sector and 
those not accompanied by an offer of equity. The necessary data for each 
particular new issue were derived from the “Greek Stock Exchange Annual 
Statistical Bulletin”, which is an official issue of the ASE, while daily share 
prices were obtained from ASE computer records. Finally, daily prices were 
properly adjusted for rights issues, stock splits and reverse splits. For each 
IPO considered, two measures were computed to estimate the magnitude of 
underpricing: (1) The “simple” underpricing, defined as the percentage 
change in price from the offering price to the close at the first day of trading 
and (2) The “adjusted” underpricing, defined as the difference between the 
percentage change of the issue price on the first day and the corresponding 
change in the market index
4
, is calculated by the following equation: 
0
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MARit = the market-adjusted return 
Pi0 = the initial offering price 
Pi1 = the first day closing price 
I0 = the value of the ASE General Index on the date of the offering 
I1 = the value of the ASE General Index on the first trading day 
 
The implicit assumption of the above abnormal return calculation proc-
ess is that the systematic risk of the IPO’s is the same to the index
5
 (Ritter, 
1991). Assuming that the risk level of the new listings is higher than average, 
this methodology is expected to produce upwards biased estimations. How-
ever, there is no evidence that the assumption is not valid. Besides, its adop-
tion enables the comparability of the results, given that it was used by almost 
all the preceding studies.   
In order to evaluate the statistical significance of the average market ad-
justed return, we use cross sectional t-statistics
6
, according to the following 
formula: 
                                                        
4
 The composite price index (ATHEX), comprises the 60 most highly capitalized 
shares of the main market and reflects the trend of the whole market. 
5
 That is the betas of the IPO’s average to one. 
6
 The t-test implies a normal distribution of the stochastic variable. 
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Where: n is the number of firms in the sample and S.D. the standard de-
viation of market-adjusted returns. Due to the presence of significant hetero-
scedasticity the White (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent t-tests were also 
computed. 
The mean cross-sectional market-adjusted return (IPO’s portfolio return) 
is calculated by the following equation: 
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Finally, the below stated variables are regressed, through a linear multi-
variate model (Model 1), against first-day returns, in order to identify their 
impact on the underpricing of the IPO’s:  
• Company’s listing delay (DEL): The number of days between 
oversubscription period and first trading day. High prices of the 
DEL-variable suggest that the investors can be better informed about 
the value of the company, thus the perceived risk is smaller.  
• Company’s operating history (AGE): The number of years be-
tween the listing time and the foundation year. New companies are 
considered more risky than the older ones.   
• Issue size (GRP):  The natural logarithm of the gross proceeds (in 
thousand euros). The size is assumed to be negatively correlated to 
the risk inherent in the new issue. 
• Reissue (REI): This dummy variable takes the price of 1 in the case 
of a reissue within the next 2 years and that of 0 otherwise. 
• Market segmentation (SEG): This dummy variable is equal to 0 if 
the IPO is listed in the Main Market (higher listing standard) and 1 
otherwise. 
• Oversubscription level (OVE) is defined as the ratio between total 
demand and supply. 
• Offering strategy (OFS): This dummy variable is equal to 0 for 
bookbuilding IPO’s and 1 otherwise). 
  
The utilization of the above mentioned parameters to test the hypotheses, 
which consist the subject of this study, is as follows:   
According to the winner’s curse hypothesis - Model 2, the more the ex-
ante uncertainty, the greater the perceived risk from the part of the non-
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informed investors.  So, a negative relationship is expected between the ex-
ante risk proxies (listing delay, company’s age and issue size) and the new 
issue’s underpricing.  
If the signalling hypothesis – Model 3 holds, a positive correlation be-
tween (adjusted) the underpricing and further seasoned offering (reissue) 
should be observed.  
The certification hypothesis – Model 5 is tested by comparing the under-
pricing in the main and the parallel market which has lower trading stan-
dards.  
The validity of the indication of interest hypothesis – Model 4 is tested 
by regressing the IPO’s performance with the variable representing the de-
mand of the new issue (oversubscription level). It is expected that the higher 
the demand the higher the performance, given that the non-satisfied demand 
of the pre-listing period will be expressed on the first trading day(s).  
In accordance with the optimal selling procedure hypothesis – Model 6, 
we expect the underpricing to be lower in IPO’s with book building, being 
coherent with the literature review. 
Table 1 summarizes the variables which are tested within the framework 
of the present study, as well their expected positive/negative relationship to 
the underpricing of the IPO’s. 
IV. Empirical results 
Table 2 presents “simple” and “adjusted” underpricing for the whole pe-
riod 1990-2003. The mean value and the number of firms are also reported; t-
tests have been conducted in order to determine the statistical significance of 
the underpricing. The results confirm that the underpricing of IPO’s, which 
was observed in many foreign markets, is observed in ASE also. The mean 
underpricing of the 258 firms of the sample, is equal to 41,53% (adjusted 
41,03%) and it is statistically significant in 9 out of the 14 years. The large 
disparity from the median suggests the presence of positive skewness in the 
distribution
7
. The observed underpricing was clearly higher than the ob-
served
8
 one in Australia (12,10%: Lee, Taylor and Walter; Woo), Austria 
(6,30%: Aussenegg), Belgium (14,60%: Rogiers, Manigart and Ooghe; 
Manigart), Canada (6,30%: Jog and Riding; Jog and Srivastava and Rakita), 
Finland (10,10%: Keloharju; Westerholm), France (11,60%: Husson and 
Jacquillat; Leleux and Muzyka; Paliard and Belletante; Derrien and 
                                                        
7
 Due to the positive skewness, the reported t-statistic (for the null hypothesis of no 
underpricing) is biased upwards and hence it must be interpreted with some caution. 
However, its high value suggests significant differences from zero. 
8
 See Table 1 in Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (2003). 
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Womack; Chahine) and Germany (27,70%: Ljungqvist). However, it was 
smaller than the underpricing which was observed in China (256,90%: Datar 
and Mao; Gu and Qin), Brazil (78,50%: Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez), 
Korea (74,30%: Dhatt, Kim and Lim; Ihm; Choi and Heo) and Malaysia 
(104,1%: Isa; Isa and Yong). It is worth noting that Kazantzis and Dylan 
(1996) have found an even higher rate of underpricing (50,89%) for the Ath-
ens Stock Exchange, but it must be stressed that their sample covered the 
period 1987-1994, that is, it included the sub-period 1987-1990 during which 
the underwriter guaranteed the offered price for six months. It can be as-
sumed, therefore, that underwriters were highly motivated to undervalue the 
issues, thus protecting their interests. This assumption seems to be reason-
able, given that 1990 exhibits the second higher underpricing in the present 
study (six months guarantee of the offer price was ceased at 17/12/1990). 
Table 3 (Panel A) presents the characteristics of the IPO’s in the sample. 
It is obvious that the number of new listings varies strongly from year to year 
(mean 18,43 / standard deviation 12,98). The same happens to the new issue 
size (mean €18.316,77 / standard deviation 44.661,60) and to the company 
size as measured by the market capitalization value (mean €127.356,70 / 
standard deviation 437.929,85). It should be noted, also that the majority of 
new issues took place during the bull market sub-periods or immediately 
after those sub-periods. More precisely, 50% of the new issues, which raised 
48,24% of the funds and accounted for 41,89% of their market capitalization 
value, were introduced in 3 of the 14 years (21,42%).  
Many researchers focused on the “lost” money from the side of the pri-
mary owners of the issuing firms, as measured by the difference between the 
first day closing price and the offering price, multiplied by the number of the 
offered shares (Ritter, 2000; Arosio, Giudice and Paleari, 2000). The calcu-
lated amount is called in the literature “money-left-on-the-table”. In the pre-
sent study, the “lost money” was on average €1.840 per issue, which ac-
counts approximately for the 10% of the issue size. Moreover, like in the US 
(Ritter, 2000) and in Italy (Arosio, Giudice and Paleari, 2000), more money 
was “left-on-the-table” in the late 90’.  
Regarding the different types of stock markets, it was found that 121 
firms went public through the Main Market (they raised €3,8 mil., that is al-
most 80% of the total funds which were invested in IPO’s), while 137 firms 
were listed in the Parallel Market (they raised approximately €0,98 mil.)  
As far as the offering strategy is concerned, 216 out of 258 companies 
adopted the fix price procedure and only 42 the solution of book building. It 
must be stressed that the Greek companies are on average listed at a higher 
age (19 years) than in USA but they are younger than their European coun-
terparts at the listing time. For example Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) have 
reported an average age of 14 years for USA, while Vandemaele (1999) 
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found 44 years for the France, Roosenboom, Goot and Mertens (2003) about 
35 years for Netherlands, Holmen and Hogfeldt (1999) more than 30 years 
for Sweden etc. 
The determinants of the underpricing 
The adjusted underpricing values were regressed against the previously 
mentioned variables (see Table 1) in order to identify the determinants of the 
IPO’s underpricing phenomenon. Dummy variables were introduced to count 
for non-quantitative factors, such as signaling, certification and placing 
methods. The main results of the performed regression analyses are reported 
in Table 4. Oversubscription level (OVE) is clearly the strongest explanatory 
variable (0,162/t-test 5,930), while statistically significant are also the issue 
delay (DEL), the issue size (GRP) and the reissue of stock (REI). Company 
age (AGE) is insignificantly
9
 correlated with the dependent variable, al-
though the expected sign is confirmed. In contrast, the sign of the market 
segmentation (SEG) and offering strategy (OFS) were unexpected and both 
variables were statistically insignificant. The results indicate also that the 
previously identified seven explanatory variables, put together, explain 
25,60% of the variation in the initial premium of the Greek IPO’s. This is 
close to the estimates of 26,46% by Arosio, Giudici and Palerai for Italian 
IPO’s and of 25% by Loughran and Ritter for US IPO’s, while are much 
higher to the estimates of 8,70% by Aussenegg (2000) and to the estimates of 
23% by Kiymaz (2000). 
Regarding the models 2 – 6, which have been formed to test the validity 
of certain hypothesis the findings have as follows: 
1. In Model 2, which has been formed to test the joint hypotheses that 
there is a positive relationship between ex-ante risks and the degree of IPO 
underpricing (winner’s curse hypothesis), the variable “issue size” (GRP) 
reflects the maintained hypothesis that on average smaller offerings are more 
speculative, than larger offerings (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). This variable is 
significant at conventional levels and it has the expected sign. Similar results 
were suggested by other researchers for the Athens Stock Exchange market 
(Kazantzis and Levis, 1995; Kouroupakis, 2002). The coefficient for listing 
delay (DEL) is also significant and has the expected sign, while the coeffi-
cient estimate for company’s operating history (AGE) is insignificant. In 
summary, it was found that there is a positive relationship between the used 
proxies of ex-ante uncertainty and expected underpricing. The empirical re-
sults offer strong support to the winner’s curse hypothesis. Barry and 
Jennings (1993), Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) and Huang (1999) 
                                                        
9
 Their statistical significance is marginally rejected at the 90% confidence level. 
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support this hypothesis, by providing evidence from the US, Latin America 
and Taiwanese markets, respectively.  In contrast to the above evidence, Lam 
and Yap (1998) and Lim and Ng (1999) reject this hypothesis based on their 
findings from the Singapore IPO market. 
2. The findings for the signaling model (Model 3), are consistent with 
the Leyland-Pyle (1977) since the probability of a seasoned offering is posi-
tively related to underpricing (0,365/t-test 3,925). Our empirical results sug-
gest that underpricing has a strong signaling effect of stock reissuance. Su 
and Fleisher (1997) and Hammed and Lim (1998) provided also supporting 
evidence to this hypothesis from the Chinese and Singapore IPO markets, 
while Gale and Stiglitz (1989), Garfinkel (1993) and Espenlaub and Tonks 
(1998) reached the reverse conclusion.  
3. The findings also support the certification hypothesis, which asserts 
that the lower underpricing of the Main Market is attributable to high listing 
standards (Model 4). Similarly, Bruton and Prasad (1997), Shaffer (1999), 
Tan, Eng and Khoo (1999) argue that high listing requirements leading to 
low underpricing. 
4. Yet, the oversubscription level (Model 5) explains partially the IPO 
underpricing (adjusted R
2
 = 0,156, the bigger one for all the calculated re-
gressions). So, Ritter’s (1988) conclusion (i.e. the higher the oversubscrip-
tion level, the higher the underpricing in order to compensate investors for 
truthfully reveals their expectations) is supported by the results of the present 
study. 
5. Finally, offering strategy (Model 6) influences the IPO underpric-
ing: If book building precedes the offering, the underpricing is significantly 
lower, as in Hanley (1993) and Arosio, Giudici and Paleari (2000). Indeed, 
during book building the underwriter is able to reduce information asymme-
try through information spreading. 
V. Conclusions 
The IPO’s underpricing phenomenon, which has attracted the interest of 
the financial community during the last two decades, has stimulated a con-
siderable volume of empirical research worldwide. The relevant studies have 
suggested several variables as responsible for the IPO’s underpricing and, 
moreover, they formed certain hypotheses to explain this phenomenon. 
Within this context, the present study is aimed to test the validity of the 
above suggestions, by utilizing the data of 258 IPO’s of the Athens Stock 
Exchange, for the period 1990-2003. 
The results support the validity of “winner’s curse”, “signaling” “certifi-
cation”, “indication of interest” and  “selling procedure” hypotheses, imply-
ing that certain characteristics of the issue (i.e. oversubscription level, issue 
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size, listing delay) are responsible for the IPO’s underpricing phenomenon in 
the Greek Stock Market. The findings are in the line with the results obtained 
by a great number of similar studies in the ASE as well as in numerous other 
stock markets. 
APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Explanatory Variables of IPO’s Underpricing 
 
Variable Definition 
Hypothesis 
Tested 
Excepted 
Sign 
Company’s list-
ing delay (DEL) 
The number of days 
between oversubscrip-
tion period and first 
trading day  
Company’s oper-
ating history 
(AGE) 
The number of years 
between the listing 
time and the founda-
tion year  
Issue size (GRP) 
The natural logarithm 
of the gross proceeds 
(in thousand euros) 
Winner’s Curse - 
Reissue (REI) 
Dummy variable 
(1=yes, 0=no) 
Signaling + 
Market segmen-
tation (SEG) 
Dummy variable (0= 
main, 1=parallel) 
Certification + 
Oversubscription 
level (OVE) 
Ratio between total 
demand and supply 
Indication of 
interest 
+ 
Offering strategy 
(OFS) 
Dummy variable (0= 
book building, 1=fixed 
price) 
Optimal selling 
procedure 
+ 
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Year Sample Size Mean t Median Mean t Median
1990 20 81.37% 5.91 82.78% 80.18% 5.87 82.74%
1991 12 15.78% 2.12 14.03% 15.86% 2.10 13.77%
1992 2 14.60% 0.36 14.60% 14.46% 0.35 14.46%
1993 6 1.94% 0.33 7.86% 1.26% 0.21 6.56%
1994 41 5.94% 8.36 7.95% 7.53% 5.02 8.13%
1995 17 5.07% 3.69 7.95% 3.88% 1.86 6.22%
1996 17 5.68% 5.18 7.95% 5.53% 5.31 7.00%
1997 10 40.07% 3.45 36.80% 41.98% 3.81 36.31%
1998 21 59.40% 7.42 62.23% 53.57% 6.15 36.70%
1999 32 105.55% 7.55 98.93% 102.70% 7.26 96.80%
2000 48 60.18% 4.26 22.24% 60.54% 4.28 23.77%
2001 16 28.78% 2.21 1.92% 30.53% 2.27 7.14%
2002 5 0.23% 0.03 0.00% 4.50% 0.54 1.81%
2003 11 5.09% 0.62 8.95% 3.46% 0.51 4.68%
Total 258 41.53% 9.99 8.72% 41.03% 9.91 15.90%
Table 2
"Simple" Underpricing "Adjusted" Underpricing
First-day returns for the 258 IPO's of the sample - Period 1990-2003
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Year
Number of 
IPO's
"Lost 
money"
Issue size
Market 
Capitalization
1990 20 5.734,89 61.181,61 370.440,89
1991 12 12.265,13 118.127,36 317.942,14
1992 2 3.523,66 24.804,67 113.213,10
1993 6 12.248,23 59.210,28 239.037,96
1994 41 44.142,63 250.479,52 1.114.424,32
1995 17 12.355,05 53.722,71 256.365,47
1996 17 33.888,79 325.509,57 5.208.498,77
1997 10 5.572,66 31.339,75 191.892,48
1998 21 48.588,48 427.550,65 2.702.679,72
1999 32 37.182,89 650.908,10 3.583.032,37
2000 48 95.574,00 1.389.385,54 11.205.665,30
2001 16 126.456,08 1.050.853,67 7.062.803,33
2002 5 6.131,38 27.476,47 133.567,62
2003 11 32.851,92 273.493,79 485.822,43
Total 258 476.515,80 4.744.043,68 32.985.385,91
Mean 18,43 1.839,83 18.316,77 127.356,70
Mean Median St. Deviation Range
Issue size (thousand 
of euros)
18.316,77 5.740,52 44.661,60 459.443,25
Company's operating 
history (years)
18,93 18,00 11,52 75,00
Company's listing 
delay (days)
28,57 31,00 16,78 88,00
Oversubscription level 
(% of the issue)
89,20 25,00 138,68 760,00
Mean
t-statistic
Median
Number of IPO's
Market index 
adjusted 
underpricing
F-statistic p-value
Main Market 121 31,93%
Parallel Market 137 49,25%
Bookbuilding 43 14,42%
Fixed Price 216 44,86%
9,91
15,90%
5,138 0,0242
12,439 0,0004
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of the Tested Variables
Note: The rest tested variables are dummy variables
Panel C: Statistics of Underpricing
Panel D: Statistics for Different Methods of Pricing and Different Trading Standards
Unadjusted underpricing
41,53%
9,99
8,72%
Market index adjusted underpricing
41,03%
Table 3
Characteristics of the Sample of IPO's
Panel A: Characteristics of the New Issues
Thousand of euros
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